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ABSTRACT 
 
In many developing countries intellectual property infringement and the commerce of pirate goods is an 
entrepreneurial activity. Digital piracy is very often the only media for having access to music, cinema, 
books and software. At the same time, bio-prospecting and infringement of indigenous knowledge rights by 
international consortiums is usual in places with high biodiversity. In these arenas transnational actors 
interact with local communities. Accusations of piracy often go both ways. This article analyzes the case of 
southeast Mexico. Using a war of attrition game theory model it explains different situations of intellectual 
property rights piracy and protection. It analyzes different levels of interaction and institutional settings 
from the global to the very local. The article proposes free IP zones as a solution of IP disputes. The 
formation of technological local clusters through Free Intellectual Property Zones (FIPZ) would allow 
firms to copy and share de facto public domain content for developing new products inside the FIPZ. 
Enforcement of intellectual property could be pursuit outside of the FIPZ. FIPZ are envisioned as a new 
type of a sui generis intellectual property regime. 
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1.INTRODUCTION 
 
During the XIII Century the pecia system was developed in Paris. This was a system of book 
production controlled by the University that flourished on the left bank of the Seine, around the 
cathedral of Notre Dame. The pecia system allowed university members to rent the texts on 
which the university masters lectured, in the form of unbound booklets or quires (peciae) so that 
they could be copied. The bookmen who rented out the booklet were known as ‘stationers’; they 
were licensed by the university and had to swear corporate and individual oaths to this institution. 
Through the pecia system the university achieved some measure of control over the production 
and sale of academic texts, mainly the texts of the authorities on which the master lectured and 
the new work written by the masters themselves. In 1316 a university provision declared that any 
established libraire selling books had to swear the university oath, a regulation confirmed by 
royal authority, thereby establishing a university-controlled monopoly of the commercial book 
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trade. Nevertheless, the grip of the university on the book trade was never complete. During XIV 
and XV centuries an increasing number of libraires escaped university control by setting up shop 
in parts of the city well outside the neighborhoods where the book trade was traditionally 
located. The Parisian libraires beyond Ile de la Cité and the Quartier Latin outside of the 
University control may be one of the first pirate industries in the West (Croenen, 2006). 
 
In the XVI century, the discovery of the Americas brought new texts to the Old World. Just after 
the conquest of Tenochtitlan, Hernán Cortes, the Spanish Conquistador, wrote to the King of 
Spain Carlos V to send physicians to study herbal indigenous medicine. In 1570 Dr. Francisco 
Hernández, physician of King Felipe II, arrived from Spain starting a long history of exchange 
between European and Indigenous American medicine. From the chronicles of Franciscan frays 
we know that Aztecs had a well established medical professions with physicians (tlama), 
surgeons (texoxolatitl and tesor) and pharmacists (papini, panamacani and panamacoyan). In 
1552, Martín de la Cruz wrote a volume about herbal indigenous medicine use in nowadays 
Mexico. Originally written in Nahuatl and later translated to Latin as Libellus de medicinalibus 
indorum herbis ("Little Book of the Medicinal Herbs of the Indians") were a codex on indigenous 
phramacopea. Perhaps the earlier written document of indigenous pharmacopeia is the Codex 
Bodley, now in Oxford University’s Bodleian Library. 
 
Yochai Benkler (2006) proposed the idea of three different layers embedded in communication 
systems that together make communication possible: (1) the physical devices and network 
channels necessary to communicate; (2) the existing information and cultural resources out of 
which new statements must be made; and (3) the logical resources the software and standards 
necessary to translate what human beings want to say to each other into signals that machines can 
process and transmit. Benkler also made the question whether there will, or will not, be a core 
common infrastructure that is governed as a commons and therefore available to anyone who 
wishes to participate in the networked information environment outside of the market-based, 
proprietary framework.  
 
Evolutionary economics considers the central features of technological systems to be economic 
competences, clustering of resources, and institutional infrastructure. A technological system is 
defined as a dynamic network of agents interacting in a specific economic area under a particular 
institutional framework and involved in the generation, diffusion, and utilization of technology. 
Technological systems are defined in terms of knowledge flows rather than flows of ordinary 
goods and services. In the presence of creative minds and sufficient critical mass, such networks 
can be transformed into development blocks, synergistic clusters of firms and technologies that 
enhance economic growth (B. Carlsson and R. Stankiewicz, 1991).   
 
This paper is about commerce and exchange of goods from the second layer mentioned by 
Benkler, and how conditions on the first and third layers affect commerce and exchange of 
information and cultural resources. At the same time, is about those networks of agents embedded 
in technological systems that interact looking for economic benefits. Specifically, the paper 
analyzes situations in the intellectual property regime in two arenas: (i) the digitalization of 
cultural industries (e.g. music, cinema); and (ii) the bioprospection of pharmaceuticals.  
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2.MASS MEDIA AND TRADITIONAL CULTURE: A STORY OF 
TWO CULTURES.   
 
In Mexico the evidence of the relationship between mass media and science and technology 
public perception is ambiguous. Table 1 shows ordinary least square (OLS) correlations estimated 
with data from Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Informatics (Instituto 
Nacional de Estadistica, Geografía e Informática, INEGI). The multivariate analysis correlates 
the public acceptance of patents and the public acceptance of complementary and alternative 
medicine (CAM).  
 
In the United States CAM is an umbrella term given to a collection of disparate healing practices. 
Some of the therapies like herbs or acupuncture are well known and fairly used. Two different 
therapies in terms of technique and theory, herbs and acupuncture are closely related within the 
holistic health system of oriental medicine (Ruggie, 2004). In this article the acronym CAM is 
applied to a broad group of methods mentioned in the Public Perception of Science and 
Technology National Survey (Encuesta sobre la Percepción Pública de la Ciencia y la Tecnología 
en México), encompassing chiropractics, acupuncture, homeopathy and traditional Mexican 
herbal remedies (limpias). The information on public acceptance of patents uses information from 
a question asking if scientist should take more care in patenting their discoveries. Two proxies for 
utopian and dystopian perception of science and technology were built. The variable utopian 
perception use information from a question asking the opinion if science would ever find the cure 
to HIV; the variable coded as dystopian perception use information from a question asking the 
opinion if science and technology would someday destroy de planet. 
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Table 1.  
Ordinary Least Squares of public acceptance of patents and public acceptance of 
CAM 
 Dependent variables 
 Public acceptance of patents Public acceptance of CAM 
Public acceptance of 
Patents 
 -0.2095* 
(0.091) 
Public acceptance of 
CAM 
-0.2003** 
(0.90) 
 
Schooling 0.0077 (0.019) 
-0.0306 
(0.015)* 
Gender (women) -0.0780 (0.079) 
-0.0291 
(0.065) 
Age 0.0002 (0.002) 
-0.0008 
(0.0017 
TV watching 
(hours per week) 
-0.0007 
(0.003) 
0.0165** 
(0.0033) 
Radio listening 
(hours per week) 
0.0473** 
(0.005) 
0.0312 
(0.003) 
Newspaper reading 
(days per week) 
0.0889** 
(0.016) 
-0.0159 
(0.0127) 
Magazine reading 
(days per two weeks) 
0.0541** 
(0.020) 
0.0312* 
(0.0146) 
Internet surfing 
(hour per week) 
-0.0139** 
(0.002) 
-0.0041* 
(0.0023) 
Computer 1.2458** (0.110) 
-0.1605 
(0.1106) 
Utopian perception 1.7216** (0.127) 
0.6924** 
(0.124) 
Dystopian perception 0.0501 (0.81) 
0.5972** 
(0.065) 
constant -1.3282 (0.196)* 
0.2767 
(0.173) 
*Statistically significant at 90% confidence interval. 
**Statistically significant with 95% of confidence interval. 
 
Regarding the exposure of Mexico’s public opinion to mass media, Table 2 shows estimates done 
using data from Mexico's 2009 National Survey on the Use of Time (Encuesta Nacional sobre el 
Uso del Tiempo, ENUT). While 60.7 percent of households own a mobile phone, making mobile 
technology the main driver in digital inclusion; 21.1 percent of households are still in a complete 
media blackout or extreme digital poverty, without access to wire or mobile telephones, the 
Internet or cable TV. 
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Table 2. 
Connectivity Diffusion per Households (%) 
Telephone Mobile Cable TV Internet Extreme  Digital Poverty* 
40.3 60.7 27.7 18.1 21.1 
Data: 2009 National Survey on the Use of Time (ENUT), INEGI 
* Any of the former connections are available in the household 
 
Although Mexico's digital poverty, 58.9 percent of hours devoted to leisure are spend on mass 
media provided activities like watching TV, surfing the Internet, reading magazines or books; 
28.1 percent of hours devoted for leisure are spend on community and social gathering; 6.7 
percent of hours are spend practicing some sport; 4.2 percent of hours are devoted to ludic 
activities, either playing and instrument or a video game; and only 2.1 percent of hours are 
devoted to cultural activities like visiting museums, concerts or exhibitions (Table 3).    
   
 
Table 3. 
Demand for Leisure   
Time Devoted to Different Activities (%) Total Hours  Women Men 
Community  and social interaction 
(e.g. parties, church, civic events, phone calls, chat) 
28.1 30.4 25.8 
Culture  
(e.g. museums, parks, cinema, exhibitions, theater, 
concerts) 
2.1 2 2.2 
Playing non-sports 
(e.g. music instruments, dancing, painting, video 
games, board games) 
4.2 3.2 5.1 
Sports  
(e.g. soccer, basketball, swimming, boxing, karate, 
jogging, biking) 
6.7 4.9 8.4 
Mass media 
(e.g. books, magazines, newspapers, TV, radio, 
Internet) 
58.9 59.5 58.5 
Data: 2009 National Survey on the Use of Time (ENUT), INEGI 
 
Taking a closer look to mass media consumption, Table 4 shows that 68.2 percent of hours are 
spend watching TV; 11.5 percent of hours are spend listening some kind of audio either listening 
the radio or music from a stream; 10.7 percent of hours are devoted to reading and only 9.6 
percent of leisure time is spend in the Internet. Mexico in this regards is neither a country of 
readers nor of hackers; it is a country of TV watchers. The low proportion of hours devoted to 
reading and surfing the web could be related to illiteracy and digital poverty. 
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Table 4. 
Mass media demand per good 
Total of hour Reading hours TV hours Audio hours Internet 
hours 
Numbe
r 
% Numbe
r 
% Numbe
r 
% Numbe
r 
% Numbe
r 
% 
483, 
800.3 
100 51940.7 10.7 329802.
6 
68.2 56030.1
5 
11.5 46026.8 9.6 
Data: 2009 National Survey on the Use of Time (ENUT), INEGI 
 
Regarding TV consumption, while 68.2 percent of hours (Table 4) devoted to mass media are 
spend watching TV only 27.7 percent (Table 2) of consumers have a connection to cable TV. 
According to the 2010 Census (INEGI, 2011) on this year 94.7 of households owned a TV. This 
evidence allow to infer that a high proportion of TV consumers are only watching channels 
broadcasted through VHF and UHF frequencies. These frequencies although legally own by the 
government are given on concession to the private duopoly TELEVISA-TVAZTECA. Both 
companies are famous for its soap opera productions, reality shows and reruns of old American 
TV series and cartoons. The biggest revenue for these networks comes from advertising, 
including government and political marketing. Any major transnational company in Mexico 
selling consumer goods advertise through their channels. Recently the results of the 2012 
presidential election were contested on tribunals arguing overspending, vote buying and TV 
network's bias. Social media movements like #yosoy132 also blamed the duopoly for 
information bias during the presidential elections. A reform to the Federal Telecommunications 
Law was passed by Congress in 2014.        
 
3.WAR OF ATTRITION IN CREATIVE AND HIGH-TECHNOLOGY 
INDUSTRIES.   
 
3.1. Digital music and video. A love story of police and pirates. 
 
Intuition about intellectual property markets can be gained from the war of attrition game. The 
war of attrition was introduced in theoretical biology by Maynard Smith (1974), to explain 
animals fight for prey. Imagine a whale's carcass in an arctic beach. This is more meat than a 
single family of polar bears can eat. Nevertheless, the bear family that first arrive to (or found) 
the carcass will have to fight other families of polar bears that arrived to (or found) the carcass 
after them. If they allow for other family to approach and feed, the incumbents risk to be vanish 
from the carcass. Each time a new family arrives the incumbents will have to fight in order to 
preserve its right to feed from the whale, or will have to leave if their contestants are strong 
enough to become the new incumbents. How many bears families would feed from a single whale 
carcass is hard to tell. The survival of the fittest, or as Smith (1982) puts it, Darwinian fitness, is 
the rule determining how many families of bears get the chance to feed from the carcass. In a 
simple fashion, Figure 2 exemplifies the game faced by both troops of bears. Q being the whale's 
carcass (could be put as pounds or calories in a whale carcass in order to have an unit), the 
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dominant strategy for both troops is to fight as long as Q is positive.  Both troops would get Q/2.   
 
Figure 1. 
War of Attrition in the arctic beach 
  Troop1 
  Fight Leave 
Troop 2 
Fight Q/2, Q/2 Q, 0 
Leave 0, Q 0,0 
With any Q>0 the dominant strategy is to compete  
 
Oligopolists are affected by many variables they cannot observe or estimate precisely: their own 
cost function, the cost function of their rivals, the state of demand or the potential of the market, 
and their rivals' strategic decisions. To the extent that some pieces of information are private we 
must envision market interaction as a game with asymmetric information. Riley (1980) and Kreps 
and Wilson (1982) introduced as asymmetric-information version to the realm of economics, 
focusing on predatory pricing behavior. In cultural industries, the war of attrition is taken through 
legal means, as well as through price wars.  
 
In industrial organization is possible to distinguish three kinds of behavior by incumbents in the 
face of an entry threat (Tirole 1995): 
 
a) Blockade entry: The incumbents compete as if there were no threat of entry. Even so, the 
market is not attractive enough to entrants. 
b) Deterred entry: Entry cannot be blockade, but the incumbent modify their behavior to 
successfully thwart entry.  
c) Accommodate entry: The incumbent find it (individually) more profitable to let entrants 
enter than to erect costly barriers to entry.  
 
Figure 2 shows this behavior in a simple way, where D1 and D2 are the blockade-deterrence cost 
for pirates and industry respectively. Dominant strategies would depend on the value of D1 and 
D2. Under asymmetric information, D1(D2) and D2(D1) are the blockade-deterrence strategies for 
pirates and industry respectively. Darwinian fitness would be replaced by a combination of 
rationality and costs structure.     
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Figure 2. 
War of Attrition in cultural industries 
  Industry 
  Blockade/Deterrence Accommodate 
Pirate 
Blockade/Deterrence Q/2-D1, Q/2- D2 Q, 0 
Accommodate 0, Q 0,0 
Dominant strategies depends on D1 and D2.    
 
Now imagine an infinite population of individuals taking upon digital production (pirates and 
non-pirates) as an entrepreneurial activity.  Let pi  be the profit for digital production:  
 
pi i =pQ /n− c− D i ; pim=pQ− c      (1) 
 
where pi i are profits for each firm on competitive equilibria and pim is monopoly profit; p is the 
price of the pirate product and Q the total demand for that product; c is the cost of production and 
n is the total number of producers in the industry. Figure 3 shows the normal form for two firms 
 
 
Figure 3. 
War of Attrition in cultural industries. Piracy as an entrepreneurial activity.  
  Industry 
  Blockade/Deterrence Accommodate 
Pirate 
Blockade/Deterrence pi 1 , pi 2  pim , 0 
Accommodate 0, pim  0,0 
Dominant strategies depends on D1 and D2.    
 
The total number n of producers (pirates and non-pirates) would be reach where pi= 0 : 
 
n=pQ / Di +c
                                     (2) 
 
The higher the cost of blockade/deterrence the lower the number of producers. The cost of 
production is not an important variable given that it has been decreasing since the invention of the 
magnetic tape in the 1950s. In fact, there is not doubt that the current shift in cultural industries 
and the mushrooming of piracy is due to the plummeting of production costs after the invention 
of MP3 file format. Independent record labels can also be benefiting from the change in costs 
structure, mainly by lower production and distribution costs.   
 
Now assume the existence of copyright in a dynamic game with infinite periods of time where the 
profit for the pirates in the black market is given by: 
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pi P=Σ0
T pQ /n
                                 (3) 
 
and for the industry is given by:   
 
   
pi I =pic +pim=Σ0
T pQ /n+ΣT∞ pQ
    (4) 
 
where pi c and pim are profits on a competitive market and on a monopoly respectively; T is the 
period where competition leaves the market.  
 
Figure 4. 
War of Attrition in cultural industries. Piracy as an entrepreneurial activity.  
  Industry 
  Blockade/Deterrence Accommodate 
Pirate 
Blockade/Deterrence pi P
- DP, pi I -DI pi P , 0 
Accommodate 0, pi I  0,0 
 
Clearly pi I >piP .  In this regards, how far is T does not matter as long as there are potential 
monopolistic gains ad infinitum after T. In the current state of affairs this potential monopolistic 
gains are given by copyright law. Once again only the costs DP and DI can change the dominant 
strategy for both (pirates and non-pirates) to enter the market.  
 
Using equation 4 we performed a very simple lineal programming simulation. We assumed that n 
decreases constantly and that DI increases also constantly. Our results (Figure 6) suggest that (at 
least under this assumptions), the industry would have to bear some economic loss before 
obtaining monopoly profits. These losses could be so deep that firms would prefer to 
accommodate before obtaining monopolistic power.    
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Figure 5. 
Profit for industry without deterrence (Di=0) cost and constant decrease of pirate's 
population (n) 
 
Profit for industry with constant decrease of pirate's population and constant increase 
in the cost of blockade/deterrence (Di>0; Di'>0) . 
 
 
 
In 2005, the OECD estimated that international trade in counterfeit/pirated products amounts to 
USD 200 billion, excluding digital products. The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) 
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was signed on the 1st October 2011. ACTA were intended to combat Intellectual Property Rights 
(IPRs) infringements, namely counterfeiting and piracy, by enhancing international cooperation 
and enforcement. The ACTA is intended to accelerate IPR enforcement, and make it more 
effective, so as to counter growth in counterfeiting and piracy. ACTA was negotiated between the 
EU and its Member States, the US, Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, 
Singapore, South Korea and Switzerland. Once the agreement has entered in force, any member 
of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) may apply to join. The EU were joined on 26 January 
2012 in Tokyo by representatives of 22 EU member states, however, the signatures need to be 
followed by ratification for ACTA to enter into force. (EU Parliament 2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The 4th of July 2012, 478 members of the European Parliament voted against the of Anti-
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Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), 39 in favor, and 165 abstained, meaning the agreement 
will not enter into force in the European Union. ACTA aimed to more effectively enforce 
intellectual property rights on an international level. However, opponents were concerned that 
ACTA would have favoured large companies' interests at the expense of citizens' rights. The 
European Commission referred ACTA to the European Court of Justice in May for a ruling on the 
agreement and asked Parliament to wait for its conclusions. Simultaneously, Parliament decided 
to press ahead with its own scrutiny of the agreement. Five committees came out against the 
agreement while the petition committee received a petition against ACTA signed by nearly three 
million people. (EU Parliament 2012) 
 
The 11th of July 2012, Mexico's ambassador to Japan signed on to ACTA. The reasons Mexico did 
not sign this agreement earlier, was that the legislature had also rejected ACTA, and the executive 
branch had to get the Mexican Senate to ratify the agreement. Since Mexico joined the World 
Trade Organization on January 1st 1995, government's executive branch has traditionally support 
international initiatives aimed to more effectively enforce intellectual property rights. Media 
companies from developed countries worried that their business suffers great damage due to 
counterfeiting and piracy, have an important (although not always effective) ally in Mexico's law 
enforcement agencies. In support to intellectual property rights agreements Mexico's signed the 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights agreement (TRIPs) and Congress approved 
related legislation even before 1995. 
 
The substantive legislation governing industrial property is contained in the Industrial Property 
Law (LPI), which has been in force since 1991. Its immediate precedent is the Law on the 
Promotion and Protection of Industrial Property, a body of law which was considered to be in 
accordance with the international standards of the time. The LPI regulates the legal concepts of 
patents, utility models and industrial designs, trade secrets, marks, advertising slogans and trade 
names, appellations of origin, and lay-out designs of integrated circuits. It also lays down the 
administrative procedures designed to protect and preserve industrial property rights and 
permitting the authorities to order the imposition of provisional measures aimed at the immediate 
suspension of allegedly violatory behavior.   
 
The area of copyright is currently governed by the Federal Law on Copyright, which came into 
force in 1996, abrogating the Federal Law on Copyright of 1956. This body of legislation 
contains provisions relating to copyright, to the moral and economic rights of authors, to the rules 
governing the transfer of such economic rights, to copyright protection, to neighboring rights, and 
to limitations on copyright and neighboring rights. It establishes guidelines with respect to 
copyright in national symbols and expressions of popular culture, registration of rights, 
reservation of rights of exclusive use, collective administration of rights, the National Copyright 
Institute, procedure before the judicial authorities, conciliation, arbitration, copyright 
infringement, trade-related infringement and administrative appeal.   
 
On the 15th of June 2006 Mexico's General Prosecutors (PGR), together with other branches of 
the executive branch and private corporations including TELEVISA, Business Software 
Association (BSA), the Motion Picture Export Association of America, Inc (MPEAA), signed the 
National Agreement Against Piracy. In the intellectual property area, Mexican law defines 
conduct that is subject to criminal action and punishable by monetary fines and imprisonment. In 
order to fulfill WTO agreements, Mexico decided to reform its legislation to ensure that conduct 
subject to criminal action in the intellectual property area was considered to constitute a serious 
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offense, not only increasing the penalties, but also eliminating the privilege of release on bail. 
(PGR 2006).  
  
In a digital divide environment where most of the piracy is done through hard copies (e.g. DVDs, 
CDs or USB memory sticks) the actions taken by PGR are old fashion raids. Between 2007 and 
2010 PGR performed 7,242 raids; arrested 2,508 persons; confiscated 353, 432, 865 million 
copies of pirate items; and dismantled 714 laboratories (Table 7). Although this apparently 
spectacular numbers, there is no way to make proper evaluation of the effectiveness and impact of 
this measures. Total numbers for piracy activities remain unknown. At the same time, given the 
low cost of digital copying technology, is very probable that as soon a pirate lab is dismantled 
another one mushroomed filling its place. High-tech measures like Digital Rights Management 
(DRM) seems highly improbable to be effective. The control over the copy of content is loose by 
corporations once products are cracked and off-line trade and exchange of hard copies come into 
place to be played in devices without an Internet connection. 
 
Notwithstanding the difficulty of doing a proper evaluation of traditional PGR's police activities, 
its raids allow to infer the proportion of copyright infringement. The higher proportion of pirate 
goods confiscated by item are hard copies of music and cinema, CDs, and DVDs, followed by 
medicines, clothing, shoes and video games on that order (Table 8). The highest proportion of 
CDs and DVDs, as well as the lowest proportion of video games confiscated is consistent with 
our estimates of demand from Table 5.   
 
4.2. Bioprospecting: Situation analysis of Maya ICBG Project in Mexico. 
 
Bioprospecting is a form of research and development (R&D) used by pharmaceutical or 
biotechnology firms to find and collect natural compounds necessary for the development of new 
drugs. It requires cooperation between bioprospecting firms and the community hosting the 
genetic resources and/or traditional knowledge. The host community provides basic or pure 
information on potential solution concepts, while the R&D firm supplies the practical capabilities 
for developing these solution concepts into marketable compounds and products. In this manner, 
primary biological information is generated and channeled through secondary R&D sector to 
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become commercial products capable of addressing consumer needs (Sarr & Swanson, 2012).   
 
To explore biodiversity in search for a medicine presents the major dilemma of where to start. In 
this process, indigenous knowledge represents an important window for narrowing the options 
and improving the probabilities of having a relevant discovery. It has been estimated that by 
consulting indigenous people bioprospectors can increase the success ratio in trial from 1 in 
10,000 samples to 1 in only 2 (Prakash 2000). The history of drug discovery implies that 
traditional ethnobotanical approaches are some of most productive of the plant surveying 
methods. A group of researchers of the University of Uppsala found that the 86 percent of the 
plants used by Samoan healers display significant biological activity. Similarly researchers at the 
Ix Chel Tropical Research Foundation in Belize discovered that extracts of the plants that use by a 
traditional healer, Don Elijio Panti, gave rise to four times as many positive results in a 
preliminary laboratory test for activity against HIV that did specimens collected randomly (Cox 
and Balick, 1994).    
 
Adapting the war of attrition model to patented industries like pharmaceuticals is not difficult. 
Particularly in cases like patent infringement on the production of HIV drugs in India the 
adaptation is straightforward. Nevertheless, when we consider bioprospecting from traditional 
knowledge in Southern Mexico (or any other part of the world with a rich biochemical public 
domain) to model competition is a little trickier.   
 
Figure 6. War of Attrition in cultural industries 
  Industry 
  Blockade/Deterrence Accommodate 
Pi
ra
te
 
Blockade/Deterrence Q/2-D1, Q/2- D2 Q, 0 
Accommodate 0, Q 0,0 
Dominant strategies depend on D1 and D2.    
 
In terms of traditional/indigenous knowledge we can imagine a population n of persons (or 
healers) holding some kind of knowledge from the public domain.  Let  be the benefit for 
using that knowledge: 
 
                   (5) 
 
Now, consider a firm acquiring the patent from some portion of that knowledge. Let be the 
benefit from the monopolistic exploitation of the patent.  
 
               (6) 
 
In both cases (5) and (6), p is the price of the medicine and Q the total demand for that product; c 
is the cost of production; INV is the cost of the investment in synthesizing the active substance 
and the legal cost of patenting. Figure 7 shows the normal form for the protection of public 
domain: 
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Figure 7. War of Attrition in bioprospecting. Public domain vs. patent protection. 
  Bioprospector firm 
  Patent Not to patent 
H
ea
le
rs
 
Blockade/Deterrence ,  , 0 
Accommodate 0 ,  ,0 
The dominant strategy is to patent and accommodate.   
 
 
 is the cost of entrance. In this scenario the dominant strategies is to patent and blockade as long 
as .  Very often is observed that the dominant strategies are blockade and not to 
patent. On that case f was so big that  . 
   
5.CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY PROPOSAL. 
 
Digital technologies offer unprecedented possibilities for human creativity, global 
communication, and access to information. Yet in the last decade, mass media companies have 
developed methods of control that undermine the public’s traditional rights to use, share, and 
reproduce information and ideas. These technologies, combined with an oligopolistic structure in 
the media industry and new laws that increase its control over intellectual products, threaten to 
undermine creativity, privacy ad free speech.  
 
In June 2000 Australia posed a question to the Permanent Mission of Mexico on the Council for 
TRIPs at WTO. The question was if there are any specific exceptions to copyright under the law 
of Mexico to allow use of copyright material by third parties for permitted purposes (such as 
research, education, fair use or fair dealing?)  Are there any significant judicial decisions with 
bearing on this issue?  Are there any specific rules or findings concerning exceptions or 
limitations to copyright protection of computer software? (WTO 2001) 
 
The mission answer that under the Federal Law on Copyright (LFDA), Title VI, merely 
establishes the limitations to copyright and neighboring rights. Until today this article haven't 
been applied: 
 
Chapter I.  Limitation in the Public Interest 
 
Article 147. The publication or translation of literary or artistic works shall be considered in the 
public interest where they are necessary for the advancement of science and national culture and 
education. Where it is not possible to obtain the consent of the owner of the corresponding 
economic rights, the Federal Executive may, through the Ministry of Public Education and either 
ex officio or at the request of a party, license the publication or translation in question against 
payment of compensatory remuneration.  The foregoing shall be without prejudice to any 
international treaties on copyright and neighbouring rights signed and ratified by Mexico. 
 
In developed countries, libraries, civic organizations, and scholars have begun to turn the idea of 
information commons, with a wide variety of open democratic information resources now 
operating or in the planning stages. These include software commons, licensing commons, open 
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access scholarly journals, digital repositories, institutional commons, and subject matter 
commons in areas like music, cinema and books. The basic characteristics in this commons is that 
they are collaborative and interactive, taking advantage of the networked environment to build 
information communities. Benefiting from network externalities, meaning that the greater the 
participation, the more valuable the resource. Many are free or low cost. Their governance is 
shared, with rules and norms that are defined and accepted by their constituents. They encourage 
and advance free expression. (Kranich, 2004) 
 
In terms of how to use combine information on biodiversity and its pharmaceutical uses for 
fostering human development, an important challenge is how to create a technological system that 
includes high tech actors (e.g. biotechnology networks), local communities and indigenous people 
related with biodiversity; and that allows the free flow of information, knowledge and technology 
on an equitable and efficient manner. Tenenbaum and Wilbanks (2008) call such system Health 
Commons: “a coalition of parties interested in changing that way basic science is translated into 
the understanding and improvement of human health. Coalition members agree to share data, 
knowledge and service under standardized terms and conditions by committing to a set of 
common technologies, digital information standards, research materials, contracts, workflows and 
software. These commitments ensure that knowledge, data, materials and tools can move 
seamlessly from partner to partner across the entire drug discovery chain. They enable 
participants to offer standardized service, ranging from simple molecular assays to complex drug 
synthesis solutions, that others can discover in directories and integrate into their own processes 
to expedite development, or assemble like LEGO blocks to create new services.”   
 
A collaborative cluster would bring common solutions to common problems, offers critical mass 
for customization of interventions, economies of scale in operation, better access to technology 
and information, greater access to customer’s channels and cheaper access to inputs and raw 
materials. The seed money would be used for to establish an organization that promotes de 
formation of public-private partnerships (PPP) for building infrastructure and propel R&D.  
 
Appropriate financial institutional infrastructure is also important in fostering business 
development and technological innovation. The record of financial institutions in this field has 
been generally poor in this part of the country.  Capital markets, such as venture capital, credit 
cooperatives and microfinance institutions play a critical role in creating SMEs. Other than 
arranging funding, venture capitalists should help groom business start-ups into competitive and 
profitable firms.   
 
A Free Intellectual Property Zones (FIPZ) would allow firms to copy and share de facto public 
domain content for developing new products inside the FIPZ. Enforcement of intellectual 
property could be pursuit outside of the FIPZ. In a sense FIPZ would be a sui generis intellectual 
property regime. Manufacturing within the FIPZ would also be extent of other intellectual 
property regimes. On drug development, the clusters could takes advantage of the rich 
biodiversity and propel the geographical agglomeration of small and medium enterprises (SME) 
as long as the manufacturing is done within the FIPZ.   
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